Division of Competence between Member States and the EC by Epiney, Astrid
Division of Competence between Member States and the EC 
 
Astrid Epiney 
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I. Introduction 
 
The issue concerning the competence to legislate is one of the key issues of the European 
convention. In this context, the question is raised in general terms (how should the 
competence be divided? which methods shall be used for this purpose? should the current 
system be thoroughly  modified?)1. However, the present paper will focus more specifically 
on  the field of environmental policy. This appears useful for at least four reasons: firstly, the 
methods of division of competence between Member States and EC/EU differ in the various 
areas of the treaty, so as to justify limitation to one domain. Secondly, environmental matters 
have certain distinctive characteristics, above all an interrelational aspect and difficulties in 
the implementation process2. Thirdly, it seems rather unlikely that the convention (and/or the 
Member States later on) will really find a general method for  the delimitation of competence, 
which means that the characteristics of the different areas will probably – one way or another 
– still play a certain role. Finally it seems useful in any case to start from the existing situation 
which requires a particular view of each domain of competence.  
Thus, the objective of the present paper can be summed up in the following points: to analyse 
the current system of division of competence in Art. 174 seq. EC Treaty (II.), to illustrate 
these principles by applying them to the special question of the right of access to justice of 
environmental organisations (III.) and, in a last stage, to show that the current system of 
division of competence seems - in principle - to be well suited to environmental matters, even 
if some clarifications could be helpful (IV.).  
                                                          
1  Cf. to this question for example von Bogdandy/Bast, Die vertikale Kompetenzordnung der EU. 
Rechtsdogmatischer Bestand und verfassungspolitische Reformperspektiven, EuGRZ 2001, 441 seq.; 
Bungenberg, Dynamische Integration, Art. 308 und die Forderung nach einem Kompetenzkatalog, EuR 
2000, 879 seq.; Bieber, Abwegige und zielführende Vorschläge: zur Kompetenzabgrenzung der 
Europäischen Union, integration 2001, 308 seq.; Pernice, Kompetenzabgrenzung im europäischen 
Verfassungsverbund, JZ 2000, 866 seq. 
2  Cf. to these particularities with further references Jans, European Environmental Law, second edition, 
2000, 17 seq., 135 seq.; Epiney, Umweltrecht in der EU, 1997, 3 seq., 105 seq.; Calliess, in: 
Calliess/Ruffert (Hrsg.), Kommentar zu EU-Vertrag und EG-Vertrag, 2. Aufl., 2002, Art. 175, Rdnr. 28 
seq. 
 
 
II. Division of competence in environmental matters: the system of Art. 174 seq. EC 
Treaty 
 
Like many provisions relative to the competence of the EC, Art. 175 EC Treaty – which is the 
relevant legal basis in the field of environmental policy – is based on the principle that the 
achievement of certain aims should be decisive in answering the question of whether or not 
the EC has the competence to adopt a certain legislative act. Art. 175 EC Treaty confers – to 
the EC – the (general) competence to adopt all measures which should help realise the 
objectives enumerated in Art. 174 EC Treaty. In other words: the range of the Communities’ 
competence in environmental matters is determined by the goals formulated in Art. 174 EC 
Treaty.  
The question which is raised by this system is whether the reference to Art. 174 EC Treaty 
could in any way imply a real limitation of the EC’s competence. This question must be 
answered in the negative: the catalogue of aims set out in Art. 174 EC Treaty is very 
extensive. Thus, the environmental policy of the EC should contribute to preserve and protect 
the environment and to improve its quality, to protect human health, to use natural resources 
in a rational way and to promote international activities in this field. The formulation of these 
objectives is so broad that it is difficult to imagine a Community measure that does not fall 
within this catalogue. It would therefore seem that the reference to the objectives of Art. 174 
EC Treaty does not really limit the Communities’ competence in the field of environmental 
policy. It can also be added that the notion of environment in Community law is a very wide 
one, even if it does not comprise all the conditions which are of importance to a person’s 
well-being: it embraces the natural environment, be it modified or not by human activities3. 
Nevertheless, the question which arises is whether the explicit indication, in Art. 174 EC 
Treaty, that EC policy should (only) contribute to realise the targets mentioned in this 
provision signifies that certain areas of competence should remain in the hands of Member 
States, thus implying that EC law acknowledges a sort of "domestic environmental 
legislation". This question must definitely be answered in the negative, for at least four 
reasons:  
- firstly, as pointed out before, the extent of the EC’s competence in the field of 
environmental policy is determined by the purpose of the planned measures to realise 
the objectives mentioned in Art. 174 EC Treaty. As a consequence, this criterion is the 
only one that is relevant in order to determine the limits of the Communities’ 
competence.  
- secondly, the reference to the realisation of the objectives of Art. 174 EC Treaty 
implies that in principle no area of policy can be excluded straight off from the 
                                                          
3  Cf. with further references Epiney, Umweltrecht in der EU, 1997, 3 seq. 
competence of the EC. In fact, a vast range of measures in numerous areas can, in 
principle, all contribute to the achievement of the aims mentioned in Art. 174 EC 
Treaty.  
- thirdly, Art. 174 and 175 EC Treaty do not contain any criteria which would make it 
possible to define the "domestic competence" of Member States one way or another.  
- fourthly, Art. 175 II EC Treaty confirms the opinion upheld in this paper: this 
provision mentions policies which, in principle, definitely fall within the competence 
of the Member States, so that this provision only makes sense if one assumes that the 
Community’s competence cannot be limited to certain areas but, on the contrary, 
extends to all material domains, provided that the foreseen measure contributes to the 
realisation of one of the objectives set out in Art. 174 EC Treaty.  
Finally, I would like to call to mind the principle of subsidiarity (Art. 5 II EC Treaty) which 
establishes the conditions under which an existing competence can be made use of4. As I am 
discussing the very existence of a competence, I will only evoke this principle in general 
terms5. 
 
 
III. Concerning the EC’s competence to introduce provisions relating to access to 
justice, especially for environmental organisations   
 
The purpose of the following chapter is to show that on the basis of the current system, as 
described above6, the Community has the competence to introduce, in a general manner, an 
obligation for Member States to implement a right of access to justice in favour of certain 
persons, especially environmental organisations.  
According to the principle that Art. 175 EC Treaty includes all measures which contribute to 
the realisation of the objectives mentioned in Art. 174 EC Treaty, the Community also has the 
competence to introduce measures tending to improve the implementation of environmental 
law. In other words, the scope of Art. 174 and 175 EC Treaty is not limited to material 
provisions but also includes instruments of procedure which could contribute to a better 
enforcement of environmental law and as a result to a better protection of the aims pursued. It 
is therefore relatively undisputed that the Community can – in a particular environmental act 
– include instruments aimed at improving implementation, such as provisions guaranteeing 
access to justice7. This point of view is convincing, because the various aspects of 
                                                          
4  Cf. only Jans, European Environmental Law, second edition, 2000, 11seq.; Epiney, Umweltrecht in der 
EU, 1997, 84 seq. 
5  Cf. III. in relation with the special question of an introduction of a general right to access to justice of 
environmental organisations.  
6  II. 
7  Cf. Ludwig Krämer, Zur innerstaatlichen Wirkung von Umwelt-Richtlinien der EWG, WiVerw 1990, 
138 (156 f.); Jane Holder/Susan Elworthy, Annotation to Case C-237/90, CMLRev 1994, 123 (132 f.); 
Wolfgang Kahl, Umweltprinzip und Gemeinschaftsrecht, 1993, 144 seq.; Bernhard Wegener, Rechte 
des Einzelnen, 1998, 85 seq.; Matthias Ruffert, Subjektive Rechte im Umweltrecht der EG, 1996, 320 
implementation – access to justice included - are very often vital in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of a legislative act. The issue is often also narrowly related to material aspects. 
Finally, the principle according to which the implementation of Community law generally 
falls within the competence of Member States, leaving them free to settle on the modalities 
("autonomy concerning the implementation instruments"), is not in conflict with the opinion 
set out above: Member States are only autonomous inasmuch as they are not bound by 
Community legislation, so that the principle mentioned cannot alter the Communities’ 
competence. No material area can be as such excluded straight off from the Communities’ 
competence since the latter is defined –in the field of environmental policy at least, but not 
only –according to the realisation of specific objectives. Many provisions can be found in the 
environmental legislation of the EC which touch on questions of implementation, including 
aspects of access to justice8. Another aspect concerns the various provisions in environmental 
directives relative to questions of  public participation9.  
The real question in this context is whether Art. 175 EC Treaty also allows the EC to pass 
legislation on issues of implementation (including access to justice) independently from a 
concrete legislative act. In other words: can the Community – on the basis of Article 175 EC 
Treaty – adopt a general directive10 containing the obligation for Member States to introduce 
certain implementation measures, including among others the guarantee of a defined access to 
justice? There could be some doubts to their right to do so, as there would be no more link to 
a specific legislative act. The Community definitely has the competence to adopt such a 
general directive: Inasmuch as it is undisputed that the Community legislator can introduce 
this type of provision in each material legislative act, there is no reason to assume that he 
could not settle such implementation issues in a general act. As a result, a general process of 
settling issues of implementation does not raise any further questions – as far as the 
competence of the Community is concerned – than those raised by an individual introduction 
in each material legislative act. Furthermore, it is allowed, under Art. 175 EC Treaty, to 
introduce - in a general way - measures which will improve the implementation of 
environmental law, since a better implementation of environmental law contributes to the 
objectives of Art. 174 EC Treaty. These measures also include the extension of access to 
justice, which constitutes one of the classical instruments leading to an improved 
implementation11. 
The obligation of Member States to introduce instruments of implementation, especially in the 
field of access to justice, can also be founded in Community legislation which is not based on 
Art. 175 EC Treaty but on other dispositions of the Treaty. Art. 6 EC Treaty makes it clear 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
seq.; Manfred Zuleeg, VVDStRL 53, 190 seq. Cf. in general to this question (competence of the 
Community to rule on aspects related to implementation) Armin Hatje, Die gemeinschaftsrechtliche 
Steuerung der Wirtschaftsverwaltung, 1998, 95 seq. 
8  E.g. Art. 4 Directive 90/313, access to information on environment. 
9  E.g. Art. 6 II Directive 85/337, environmental impact assessment, Art. 15 I Directive 96/61. 
10  In any case a directive would be probably more suitable than a regulation.  
11  See also Ruffert, Subjektive Rechte im Umweltrecht, 1996, 320 seq. 
that environmental matters can also be pursued in other areas of policy. Therefore, the 
competence of the Community to introduce implementation measures must also be extended 
to acts in these areas. In this perspective, Art. 175 EC Treaty allows the EC to impose 
obligations on the Member States to take special implementation measures. This article can 
therefore be regarded as an independent legal basis for the decreeing of acts containing 
provisions the objective of which is to improve the implementation of environment-related 
obligations.  
These considerations show that the competence of the EC to introduce a right of access to 
justice for environmental organisations is limited to matters which concern the 
implementation of Community legislation. In other words: the EC can only stipulate an 
obligation for Member States to introduce a right for environmental associations to invoke a 
violation of EC law or of national law founded on EC law (as transposed directives). 
Therefore, the national legislator cannot be obliged to introduce a general access to justice for 
environmental organisations allowing them to invoke violation of a purely national 
environmental legislation12. National environmental legislation is adopted by the national 
legislator on the basis of a purely national decision; therefore if the Member States can decide 
on the adoption of material rules, they must also have the competence to decide how they 
want to ensure the implementation of the national legislation and whether or not they want to 
introduce a right of access for certain persons, especially for environmental associations. The 
competence of Art. 175 EC Treaty (in relation with Art. 174 EC Treaty) refers only to 
Community legislation and its implementation; Art. 175 EC Treaty does not lay down any 
kind of general clause obliging Member States to adopt measures which will ensure a more 
effective implementation of environmental legislation, even a national one. Therefore, the 
Community’s competence to adopt measures related to implementation has a subsidiary 
character. On the other hand, these principles do not mean that national legislation can never 
be the object of a Community obligation to introduce a right of access to justice for 
environmental associations: the right of access to justice can be justified, provided that the 
national legislation transposes or implements Community law, since in this case the object of 
the implementation is - at least indirectly - Community legislation13.  
In principle, the introduction of a right of access to justice for environmental organisations in 
the sense mentioned above would also satisfy the requirements of the principle of subsidiarity 
(Art. 5 II EC Treaty)14: Since the deficiency in the implementation of Community 
environmental law is a recurrent phenomenon, the aim of such a measure cannot be achieved 
                                                          
12  The opposite view is defended by Führ/Gerbers/Ormond/Roller, elni Newsletter 1994, 3 (6, 8 s.). 
13  The problem is parallel to the question of the conditions under which fundamental rights of the 
European legal order are also binding for Member States. For more details on this problem with further 
references, see  Epiney, Umgekehrte Diskriminierungen, 1995, 125 seq. 
14  For more details on this principle with special reference to environmental policy, see Jans, European 
Environmental Law, second edition, 2000, 11 seq., who comes to the conclusion that "an examination 
of Community environmental legislation in the light of the above guidelines  would reveal that probably 
not one environmental directive or regulation  would fail to pass the test." (p. 14).  
– in a sufficient manner – on a national level. It is sufficient that the aim of the measure 
cannot be, de facto, efficiently  realised on the level of the Member States; a real impossibility 
is not required. If a right to access of environmental associations is introduced, experience in 
different States15 has shown that this instrument improves the implementation of 
environmental legislation in general so that the aim pursued can be better achieved on the 
level of the Community 16.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion: evaluation of the current system and perspectives for the division of 
competence in the field of environmental policy  
 
The current system according to which the range of the EC's competence in the field of 
environmental policy is defined in relation to the objectives of environmental policy, 
themselves defined in a broad manner, should be maintained. This system makes it possible to 
react to the relevant and important problems in the field of environment and to take the 
necessary measures in order to achieve the desired aims. Furthermore, it is a necessary 
condition in order to enable the Community to take all measures for a coherent environmental 
policy. This system also takes into account the interdependence which characterises 
environmental tasks: very often, the lack of measures in one area brings about important 
consequences for other areas so that an orientation towards the aims of environmental policy 
seems to be the best solution for defining the Communities’ competence. This means that in 
the area of environment there should be no division of competence as regards narrowly and 
completely defined fields ("sachgegenständlich"), but there should be –in the future as well – 
a clear reference to the aim of environmental policy in relation with a large notion of 
environment. Thus, as in numerous other areas of the EC's competence, its competence in the 
field of environment is on the one side defined in relation to a (wide) area (environment), and 
on the other side determined by the effectiveness of the measure in the realisation of the aims 
defined in the Treaty17.  
                                                          
15  See the overview by Epiney, Gemeinschaftsrecht und Verbandsklage, NVwZ 1999, 485 (486); see also 
in relation to the situation in different Member States Epiney/Sollberger, Zugang zu Gerichten und 
gerichtliche Kontrolle im Umweltrecht. Rechtsvergleich, völker- und europarechtliche Vorgaben und 
Perspektiven für das deutsche Recht, 2001, 29 seq. 
16  If the EC has the competence to impose an obligation for Member States to introduce an access to 
justice for environmental organisations, the form in which such an obligation should be introduced must 
be decided in a second step. This point is not included in the topic of this paper, however for more 
details on this subject, see Epiney, Gemeinschaftsrecht und Verbandsklage, NVwZ 1999, 485 (493 
seq.). 
17  In principle, almost all the competences in the Treaty are defined in that way. They distinguish 
essentially by the reference to a certain domain (environment, transport etc.) or by the lacking of such 
reference (as Art. 94 s. EC Treaty). So, it would be a fundamental change to alter this system in favour 
of a sort of enumeration of areas ("sachgegenständlich") for which the EC should be competent. Cf. in 
relation to the current discussion von Bogdandy/Bast, Die vertikale Kompetenzordnung der EU. 
Rechtsdogmatischer Bestand und verfassungspolitische Reformperspektiven, EuGRZ 2001, 441 seq.; 
Bungenberg, Dynamische Integration, Art. 308 und die Forderung nach einem Kompetenzkatalog, EuR 
2000, 879 seq.; Bieber, Abwegige und zielführende Vorschläge: zur Kompetenzabgrenzung der 
Above all, the maintenance of the current system would have the following consequences:  
- From the perspective of the EC, there will / should be no limiting list of areas which 
can be the object of Community legislation. 
- From the point of view of the Member States, there will / should not exist a list of 
"reserved domains" in which the Community can in no case take legislative measures. 
If the competence of the EC is defined in relation with the contribution of a measure to 
the realisation of aims, no substantial field can be excluded from the very beginning. 
In other words, the competence of the EC will / should be defined by its contribution 
to an aim and not by its belonging to a specific domain, so that from a material point 
of view no domain can be excluded straight off from EC legislation. 
- Community action does not necessarily require a link to another Member State; the 
aims actually defined in Art. 174 can be dealt with even if there is no link to another 
Member State. 
- Community measures relating to implementation fall within the competence of the EC. 
Over and above the arguments already mentioned above, it must be pointed out that 
the limits between material measures and measures only relating to implementation 
are blurred and in any case difficult to define.  
- The division of competence itself should not be determined by the principle of 
subsidiarity. It does not seem possible to precisely define domains which – on the 
basis of an application of the principle of subsidiarity - should fall within the 
competence of the EC and others (only) within the competence of Member States. 
Such a system would lead to endangering the realisation of the aims of environmental 
policy in the EU. Furthermore, it does not seem possible to find the "right" solution as 
regards the division of competence, on the basis of a scientific analysis of the principle 
of subsidiarity.  
This plea for the maintenance of the current system does not mean that there is no need at all 
to reform the division of competence between EU and Member States. However, in my 
opinion – and this affirmation is not limited to the domain of environmental policy – the need 
for a reform is merely an affair of clearer presentation and formulation of the system of 
division of competence; the substance – in particular the orientation of the EC’s competence 
towards the realisation of aims – should not be changed. Above all, the question of the 
legislative procedure must be raised, especially in the field of environment policy. Therefore 
there is no reason (apart from the merely "selfish" interests of certain Member States) for Art. 
175 II EC Treaty to reserve the procedure of unanimity for the domains mentioned in this 
provision and for it to not set down the procedure of codecision.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Europäischen Union, integration 2001, 308 seq.; Pernice, Kompetenzabgrenzung im europäischen 
Verfassungsverbund, JZ 2000, 866 seq. 
 
 
 
